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ABSTRACT 
 
Wireless ad hoc networks have gained lots of attention due to their ease and low cost of deployment. This 
has made ad hoc networks of great importance in numerous military and civilian applications. But, the lack 
of centralized management of these networks makes them vulnerable to a number of security attacks. One 
of the attacks is packet drop attack, where a compromised node drops packets maliciously. Several 
techniques have been proposed to detect the packet drop attack in wireless ad hoc networks. Therefore, in 
this paper we review some of the packet drop attack detection techniques and comparatively analyze them 
basing on; their ability to detect the attack under different attack strategies (partial and or cooperate 
attacks), environments and the computational and communication overheads caused in the process of 
detection. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless ad hoc networks are a group of computing devices equipped with radio transceivers and 
interconnected wirelessly through radio frequency without a fixed infrastructure or centralized 
control [13]. The most common examples of wireless ad hoc networks are wireless sensor 
networks [1] [22] and mobile ad hoc networks [2]. 
 
In wireless ad hoc networks, nodes communicate with each other using multi hop wireless links. 
Data to out of range nodes can be routed through intermediate nodes. That is nodes in wireless ad 
hoc networks can act as both hosts and routers. There are numerous application areas in which 
wireless ad hoc networks can be used ranging from military operations and emergency disaster 
relief to community networking and interaction among meeting attendees or students during 
lectures [21].  
 
One basic assumption according to Djahel et al [3] in design of routing protocols in wireless ad 
hoc networks is that, every node is honest and cooperative. This introduces a vulnerability that 
can be exploited for launching attacks. An example of such attack is the malicious packet 
dropping.   
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A number of techniques have been proposed in literature to mitigate the packet dropping problem 
in wireless ad hoc networks. In this paper, we review some of the malicious packet dropping 
detection techniques proposed in literature and comparatively analyze them. The rest of the paper 
is organized as follows; section 2 discusses packet dropping in wireless ad hoc networks, in 
section 3, we discuss some of the packet  drop attack detection  techniques proposed,  section 4 
presents a malicious node identification tool, section 5 compares these techniques under different 
scenarios and section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. PACKET DROPPING IN WIRELESS AD HOC NETWORKS 
 
Like in any other network, packet loss is expected in ad hoc networks at least to an acceptable 
percentage.  Not all packets lost should be viewed as malicious. In this section, we discuss some 
of the packet loss scenarios in wireless ad hoc networks. 
 
2.1 Legitimate Packet Dropping 
 
Packet dropping can be experienced in wireless ad hoc networks where no compromised nodes 
are present. This packet loss is mainly associated with the following events; 
 
I. Network Congestion 
 
Network congestion in wireless ad hoc networks is something unavoidable. These networks are 
mainly scalable due to in and out movements of nodes. As a result, congestion is more likely to 
happen which can lead to loss of packets. 
 
II. Channel Conditions 
 
In wireless networking the channel condition cannot be neglected since it changes drastically.  
Free path loss, interference, presence of noise on the channel and fading of the transmitted 
wireless signals are among the channel conditions that can lead to packet loss or bit errors in the 
transmitted signal. In the presence of these factors, some packets can get dropped. 
  
III. Resource Constraints 
 
Nodes in wireless ad hoc networks have limited energy resource [23] [24] [30]. Intermediate 
nodes in these networks may behave selfishly and fail to forward the received packets in order to 
conserve their limited resources battery power. These packets in turn get dropped. 
 
2.2 Malicious Packet Dropping 
 
Mostly, the first step in launching a packet dropping attack is for a malicious node to get involved 
during route formation.  This is better done by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the underlying 
well known routing protocols used in wireless ad hoc networks which are designed basing on the 
assumption of trustworthiness between nodes in a network.  
 
Once in the route, the malicious node can do anything including maliciously dropping packets. 
This Packet dropping at a malicious intermediate node can lead to suspension of communication 
or generation of wrong information between the source and destination which is an undesirable 
situation. For better understanding, following are the illustrations of malicious packet dropping 
scenarios in wireless ad hoc networks under the two commonly used routing protocols AODV 
(Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector) and OLSR (Optimized Link State Routing). 
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 Figure 1. Route Discovery in AODV [4] 
 
A. Packet Dropping in AODV 
 
The route discovery process between source (S) and destination (D) under AODV routing 
protocol is as illustrated in Figure 1.The source broadcasts a RREQ (Route Request) message 
with unique identifier to all its one hop neighbors. Each  receiver  rebroadcasts  this  message  to 
its  one  hop  neighbors  until  it  reaches  the destination. 
 
The destination on receiving the message updates the sequence number of the source and sends a 
RREP (Route Reply) message back to its neighbor which relayed the RREQ. On the other hand, 
an intermediate node that has a route to the destination with destination  sequence  number  equal  
to  the one in RREQ can send back a RREP  packet to  the  source  node  without  relaying  to  the 
destination. 
 
For a node to launch packet dropping attack, it  must  be  involved  in  at  least  one routing  paths  
in  the  network.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, C is a malicious node intending to drop packets 
from S to D. To discover a path from S to D, S first broadcasts RREQ packet to its neighbors.  
Each neighboring node continues to rebroadcast this message as explained earlier until it reaches 
D. 
 
Figure 2. Packet Dropping Attack in AODV [4] 
 
The malicious node C disobeys this rule and lies to S claiming it has the shortest path to D and 
sends a RREP packet to S. As a result, S assumes that the shortest route to D is through C and 
starts to send data packets to D through C which are in turn dropped. 
 
B. Packet Dropping in OLSR 
 
OLSR uses Multipoint Relays (MPRs) which are set of neighboring nodes that are responsible for 
spreading the local link state information to the whole network for optimization.  The link state is 
broadcasted periodically through Topology Control (TP) messages.  Each node in OLSR selects 
its MPR set from its one hop neighbors such that  it  can  easily  reach  all  its  two  hop neighbors 
with  minimum  number  of retransmissions. 
 
Selection of the MPR depends on the number of  two  hop  neighbors  reachable through  the  
candidate  node  and its “Willingness  value  obtained  from  “Hello” message  which  indicates  
the  readiness  of  a node to forward packets of its neighbors. 
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Through periodic exchange of link state, each node senses its neighbors and disseminates the 
network topology.  Each node constructs a partial topology graph of the network from 
broadcasted TC messages which allows it to establish routes to non-neighboring nodes. 
 
For a packet dropping attack, a malicious node may send a TC message claiming to be a MPR of 
nodes although it may not. As the network  depends  on  the  MPRs  for  routing services,  the  
malicious  node  may  decide  to drop packets passing through it. 
 
3. PACKET  DROPPING  ATTACK DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
A number of malicious packet dropping detection techniques have been proposed in literature. In 
this section we discuss some of them; 
 
3.1 Watch Dog Technique 
 
The watch dog technique has been the most well know node misbehavior detection in ad hoc 
networks.  In this technique, every node acts as a watchdog agent monitoring packet 
transmissions to neighboring nodes [17]. The watchdog agents save a copy of packets in their 
watchdog monitoring buffers before their transmission to the next node. This serves to monitor 
packet relay from a neighboring node to the next node. 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. An illustration of Watch Dog [17] 
 
Figure 3 shows an example of watchdog.  “S” is the source node and “D” is the destination node.  
The other nodes are intermediate nodes in the route between ‘S’ and ‘D’.  Before ‘A’  forwards  a 
packet received  from  ‘S’,  it  saves  the  packet  in  its watchdog  monitoring  buffer.  After 
forwarding  the  packet  to  ‘B’,  ‘A’  monitors whether  the  packet  has  been  forwarded  to ‘C’. 
This is because ‘A’ is expected to receive a copy of the packet forwarded to ‘C’ since it’s within 
‘B’s transmission range. ‘A’ then compares the received packet with the one saved in its watchdog 
monitoring buffer. If ‘A’ fails to receive a copy of the packet from ‘B’ within certain duration, it 
reduces the confidence level of ‘B’ by 0.05.  When this happens in recurring manner, the 
confidence level  is  set  to  zero  and  ‘A’  decides  that  ‘B’  is a  malicious  node  and  sends  an  
alarm so as to change the route through ‘B’. Meanwhile  if  ‘B’  forwards  the  packet  within the  
time  duration,  ‘A’  rewards  ‘B’  by increasing its confidence level by 0.01. 
 
Forootaninia et al [10], proposed an improved version of watch dog technique (I-Watch dog). In I-
Watch dog technique, the cluster head is assumed to be the watchdog as illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Proposed Improved-Watchdog (I-Watchdog) [10] 
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Incase node A wants to communicate with node C, node M which is the cluster head acts as the 
watchdog. It’s assumed that, M has a buffer that accommodates all the sent packets within its 
range. Node B is the intermediate node between A and C. M monitors the packet forwarding 
character of B after receiving A’s message which is stored in its buffer and compares the received 
copy from B with the buffered message. If the messages are similar, the buffered message is 
dropped. Otherwise, it is considered that, B has not sent the message or replaced with another. 
This work though improves the life span and power consumption of sensor nodes, has not 
addressed the packet dropping detection inefficiencies of watch dog technique. 
 
Under circumstances of ambiguous collision problems, False misbehavior, receiver collision 
problems insufficient transmission power, Cooperated misbehavior and partial packet dropping 
[25] [27], watch dog technique fails. Since watch dog relies on confidence values, a malicious 
node can partially drop packets so that its confidence value does not come to zero. This technique 
is only suitable in environments in which the watch dog agent has knowledge of its two hop 
neighbors [26]. As a result, it is only more effective in source routing protocols like Dynamic 
Source Routing (DSR). 
 
3.2 Side Channel Monitoring (SCM) 
 
In SCM a sub-set of neighbors for each node in a  route  between  source  and  destination are  
selected  to  observe  and  monitor  their message  forwarding  behaviors  [18].  Alarm channel 
(Primary channel and Side channel) is generated to inform the source about the misbehaving  
node;  The  Primary  channel (PC) is formed by nodes in the route and  Side  channel (SC)  is  
formed  by  sub-set  of  monitoring neighbors. 
 
As an example, consider an established data communication path R = a0. . . ak+1 with k ≥ 0 and a0 , 
ak+1 being source and destination respectively. It’s assumed that a1,. . . , ak are normal at the route 
establishment time and that a0 and ak+1 are always normal during their communication time. 
Packets transmitted along R can be classified as data packets or alarm packets. Data packets flow 
from a0 to ak+1 meanwhile alarm packets flow in the opposite direction. The alarm packets are 
normally generated by intermediate nodes and transmitted to the source through the SC. 
In (Figure 5a), for the two successive nodes ai−1 and ai between the source and destination, a set Gi 
of nodes are selected as observers. The selected nodes in Gi are responsible for monitoring 
whether ai forwards ai−1’s data packets towards ak+1 and generate an alarm when it fails to forward 
within a given time window. In Figure 5b, the logical view of observer nodes is presented. Gi [1 2 
3 4 5] monitors ai-1 and Gi+1 [4 5 6 7 8 9] monitors ai.  
 
Figure 5. An illustration of Side Channel monitoring Technique [18] 
 
For a particular node under observation, the set of monitoring nodes keep observing its data 
forwarding behavior.  If  it  fails  to forward  a  data  packet  within  a  given  time period, the set 
generates an alarm that is sent to  the  source  through  the  SC  created between  different  sets  of  
a b c 
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monitoring  nodes as illustrated  in    Figure 5c.  The  watch dog nodes  in  the  path  also  
construct  a  PC  for forwarding such kind of misbehavior to the  to the source. 
 
The source accumulates this information about a particular node and once it has exceeded a 
threshold value, it generates a warning message that is forwarded to all the nodes in the network 
and reconstructs a different path that excludes the misbehaving node. 
 
Since, the primary channel operates the same way as the watch dog and all the neighboring nodes 
have the ability to do side channel monitoring, in mobile environments, SCM detects packet drop 
attack.  SCM on the other side generates lots of network traffic from the side channels and 
primary channel causing communication overhead. 
 
3.3 Monitoring Agent Technique 
 
[19], proposed the monitoring agent technique.  The  technique  is  based  on capturing  packets  
sent  by  neighboring nodes  within a  transmission  range. All  the nodes in a network collect 
information about their  one  hop  neighbors  within  a  certain period  of  time.  The collected  
information include;  the  total  number  of  packets transmitted  from  a  particular  node  (WLi), 
the  average  number  of  transmitted  packets from  all  its  one  hop  neighbors  (AWL),  the 
packet  drop  rate  of  a  particular  one  hop neighbor (DRi),  and  the  average  packet dropping  
rate  by  all  its  one  hop  neighbors (ADR ) which  are  used  for  identifying  a malicious node. 
Figure 6 is an illustration of the concept and S is the monitoring agent. S uses  information  
collected  from  its neighbors  to  determine  whether  there  are legitimate  or  malicious  nodes.  
Assuming the information S collected during a certain period from its neighbors is as in table 1. 
 
 Figure 6. An illustration of monitoring Agent [19] 
 
 
Table 1. Measured sample values [19] 
 
From table 1, node A is assumed to be a malicious node due to its high packet drop rate. 
Another parameter DEVi (ADR‐DRi) helps in determining a suspicious node.  DEVi  is calculated  
for  each  node  before  sending  a packet  from  the  monitoring  node  to  each neighboring node. 
The nodes are then sort in a descending order based on DEVi to classify the suspicious and 
normal nodes as illustrated in the table 2. 
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Table 2. DEVi sorted in descending order [19] 
 
Also a parameter Dn (Average packet drop rate (ADR) /2) is calculated.  If  a  node  has  DEVi 
more  than  Dn,  it’s  assumed  to  be  normal otherwise it’s considered malicious. 
 
To reduce false negatives (whether a node dropped  packets  maliciously  or  due  to traffic  
problem),  AWL (average of packet transmission by  neighboring  nodes)  is calculated.  In table 1, 
the AWL during a certain period of time is 224.  The total  number  of  packets  broadcasted  by  a 
malicious  node  A  during  that  period  was 100  and  this  was  lower  than  the  average number  
of  packets,  so  it  had  a  high  packet drop  rate.  Thus,  monitoring  node  S determined  that  
node  A  was  maliciously dropping  packets  and  an  alarm  message was  sent  to  the  entire  
network  so  as  to  inform the source. 
 
3.4 Sequence Number Model 
 
In [20], another technique “Sequence number model technique” for detecting packet dropping 
attack was proposed.  Consider Fig 6,  source  (S)  is  out  of communication range with 
destination (R) and uses  intermediate  node  ‘X’  to  reach  ‘R’.  When ‘R’  determines  that  the  
rate  of  packet  loss using  TCP  sequence  number  through  ‘X’  has exceeded  a  certain  
threshold  value,  ‘R’ becomes  suspicious  and  starts  the investigation. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. An illustration of Sequence number model [20] 
 
‘R’ first sends ‘X’ a message requesting it to broadcast a special message to all its neighbors. The 
special message  requests  all X’s  neighbors  to  send  ‘R’  a  secure  message communicating  the  
traffic  amount  they forward to ‘X’.  Once ‘R’ sends the special message to ‘X’, it starts to 
monitor ‘X’ to determine whether it will send the message to its neighbors. To prevent an intruder 
from making  X’s  neighbors  sending ‘R’ false message  in  response  to  its query,  an 
authentication  system  based  on  private symmetric session key is used. Once ‘R’ gathers  all  the 
information from X’s neighbors, it  can  determine  whether  the packet  loss  is  due  to  
congestion  or malicious. 
 
If another node other than ‘X’, say ‘Y’ is the one compromising the network, it may decide to 
send false information to ‘R’.  To overcome this, each node is asked to monitor the total traffic 
sent by each of its neighbors. This helps ‘X’ to identify the true intruder ‘Y’ and informs ‘R’ about 
it. 
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3.5 PathRater 
 
PathRater is run by every node in the network [31] [26]. A node maintains ratings for every other 
node it knows in the network basing on the knowledge of misbehaving nodes and link reliability 
data in order to choose the most suitable path. A path metric is calculated by averaging the ratings 
for nodes in the path. In case there is more than one path to the destination, the path with the 
highest metric is chosen. A pathrater node assigns a neutral rating of 0.5 to nodes known to it. It 
normally assigns itself a rating of 1. The ratings are updated in intervals of 200ms. The ratings for 
nodes in active path are increased by 0.01 and the maximum rating a node can attain is 0.8. A 
node’s rating is decreased by 0.05 when a link break is detected and the node becomes 
unreachable.  
 
A negative path metric value indicates presence of misbehaving nodes in the path. Due to faults 
or false accusations, a node may be marked as a misbehaving node. It is generally better not to 
permanently mark it as misbehaving node. Therefore, the marked misbehaving nodes’ rating 
should be increased slowly or set back to 0.0 after a long time period. 
 
When a pathrater detects a misbehaving node in a path it is using and fails to get an alternative 
path free of misbehaving nodes, it sends out a route request message called Send Route Request 
(SRR) [31]. This way, a new metric can be constructed from which a new path can be determined. 
 
3.6 TwoAck 
 
In this technique, packets sent by a node are expected to be received by nodes which are two hops 
away in the path [32]. Nodes in a path are expected to send acknowledgement packets called 
TWOACK packets two hops backwards. If a node fails to receive TWOACK packet after sending 
or forwarding packets, the next node’s link is considered to be misbehaving and will be 
eliminated in the next routing. 
 
In order to reduce the overhead due to these acknowledgement messages, a scheme called 
selective-TWOACK (S-TWOACK) which selectively acknowledges packets was proposed in 
[33]. In this scheme, an acknowledgement is sent after receiving certain number of data packets. 
 
4. MALICIOUS NODE IDENTIFICATION 
 
Not all the packet dropping detection techniques can identify malicious nodes. Some simply 
detect the packet dropping misbehavior without identifying the malicious node. Once malicious 
packet dropping behavior is detected, the responsible malicious node needs to be identified. There 
is one malicious node identification tool (traceroute tool) being used in wired networks which can 
be adopted for wireless ad hoc networks [28]. 
 
4.1 Traceroute 
 
Traceroute [29] is used to determine the route to a destination node. It sends probing UDP 
messages with increasing Time-to-Live (TTL) values towards the destination. The first probe is 
assigned a TTL value of 1. This enables the message to travel only the first hop in the path to 
destination. Once the TTL elapses, the packet gets dropped and an ICMP time exceeded message 
is sent back to the probing node. The probing node then keeps on increasing the TTL value for the 
successive probing UDP messages until it reaches all the intermediate nodes between the source 
and the destination. Every time the UDP packet gets dropped, an ICMP port unreachable message 
is sent back to the source as illustrated in Figure 8.  
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In Figure 8, node 1 wants to reach node 9. It sends probing UDP messages with increasing TTL 
values until it reaches the destination node 9. Every time a TTL elapses in an intermediate node, 
the node sends back an ICMP time exceeded (TE) message to node 1 with its address. This way, 
node 1 is able to know the route to node 9 by combing the received addresses from the respective 
ICMP messages.  
 
In case a malicious packet dropping node is in the route between the source and the destination, 
the sent UDP messages get dropped and fail to reach the destination. Since, for every dropped 
packet an ICMP message containing the address of the dropping node is sent back to the source, it 
is possible to isolate and identify the malicious node. 
 
 
Figure 8. An Illustration of traceroute [28]. 
 
5. COMPARISON OF THE PACKET DROP ATTACK DETECTION 
TECHNIQUES 
 
In this section, we compare the discussed packet dropping attack detection techniques in terms of; 
the attack kinds they can detect (partial and cooperate attacks), the potential to detect attacks in 
mobile environments, the computational overhead and the communication overhead caused. 
Some malicious packet dropping detection techniques in wireless ad hoc networks consider a 
node  malicious  if  it drops  packets  above  a  certain  threshold value,  the  partial  attack  
exploits  this principle  in  that  the  malicious  node  if aware  of  the  threshold  will  drop  
packets  to a value  just  below  the  threshold. On the other hand, cooperate attack is one where 
two or more coordinated malicious nodes are used to launch an attack. The malicious nodes may 
be on the same or different routes but usually are synchronized. 
 
The comparison for the different packet dropping attack detections are illustrated in table 3. 
 
Technique Computation
al Overhead 
Communicatio
n Overhead 
Mobility 
Environme
nt 
Partial 
Attack 
Cooperate 
Attack 
Watch Dog Low Low Yes No No 
SCM Average Average Yes Yes Yes 
Monitoring 
Agent High Average No Yes Yes 
Sequence 
Number Model Average High No Yes No 
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PathRater Average Low Yes No Yes 
TwoAck Low High Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table3. Comparison of the different Packet dropping Attack Detection techniques 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Wireless ad hoc networks are widely used in military and civilian applications. Security which is 
a critical factor is a concern in these kind of networks due to lack of centralized control. This 
results into launching of different attacks including the packet dropping attack in these kind of 
networks.  In this work, we reviewed the malicious packet dropping in wireless ad hoc networks 
considering the two common routing protocols AODV and OLSR as example cases. We 
comparatively analyzed some of the malicious packet dropping detection techniques proposed to 
assess their effectiveness and limitations. The Watch Dog though produces less computational and 
communication overhead is susceptible under partial and cooperate attacks. The SCM produces 
average computational and communication overheads as it detects different kinds of attacks in 
mobile environments. The Monitoring Agent produces high overheads in detecting different 
attack kinds and is susceptible in mobile environments. And the sequence number technique as 
well produces high overheads and is susceptible in mobile environments and does not detect all 
attack kinds.  
 
Depending on the anticipated attack strategy, network environment (mobile or stationary) and the 
processing power of the nodes to be used in a given wireless ad hoc network the choice of a 
malicious packet dropping technique can be guided by this work. As a future work, designing a 
malicious packet dropping detection technique that effectively detects the packet dropping attack 
in any environment while keeping the generated overheads minimal will be our focus. 
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